The Department of Justice’s antitrust action against Google’s online search monopoly concluded its remedies phase on May 30. Judge Amit Mehta agreed with the DOJ last autumn that Google had engaged in anticompetitive behavior to control the online search business. His remedy decision is now anticipated in August. The verdict might mandate the divestiture of Chrome, the most popular browser in the world with over four billion monthly active users, if he votes with the government once more.
Chrome was not the main target of Google’s anticompetitive actions, which included paying Apple and Mozilla to make Google Search the default search engine on their web browsers and mandating that Google Search be preinstalled as the default on phones made with Google’s Android operating system. The DOJ contends, however, that a sale of Chrome will help restructure competition in the internet search market by separating Google’s search engine and browsers.
As anticipated, Google is adamantly opposed to this split scenario and has warned that it will result in a number of horrible outcomes, ranging from a loss of user privacy and cybersecurity breaches to a worsening of the user experience on other Google products.
It’s important to go over how the remedies phase has emphasized the necessity of spinning off Chrome as we get closer to a conclusion in this case.
Why is Chrome being highlighted?
Google has maintained that Chrome has no bearing on its monopoly on searches. Google’s exclusive distribution arrangements with Apple for Google Search and its tie-ups with Android-powered phone makers were major points of contention in the government’s case. Nonetheless, there was a lot of talk throughout last year’s trial about how important browsers are to search engine distribution. The conversations demonstrated how Chrome became a crucial component of Google’s search monopoly, serving as a source of data scale as well as a barrier to entry in online search.
Google did not only mandate that Google Search be the default on Android phones. Additionally, Chrome had to be preloaded on their phones and users couldn’t uninstall it. Users can quickly remove additional browsers at the same time.
In the United States, Android accounts for 40% of the smartphone software market. Google Search is the default option on about 60% of the remaining smartphone software in the United States due to Google’s $18 billion yearly deal with Apple. According to behavioral economics research, competitors find it extremely difficult to overcome default status. Despite Mozilla’s modest market share, Google also pays Firefox’s Mozilla for default placement; the sums have climbed over time, with one percent going to mobile and seven percent going to desktop. Google has restricted how people browse the internet through these contracts. These agreements highlight the necessity for Google to control the browser market in order to dominate the market for internet searches.
The weaknesses in the defense of Google
Google’s justifications for keeping Chrome omitted how they could keep control while allowing rivals to use the browser, such as by not making its own search engine the default. Rather, Google’s argument emphasized how it is allegedly impossible to divest Chrome due to the numerous interdependencies between Chrome and other Google technologies. These include Google’s Safe Browsing and ChromeOS on Chromebooks. According to its leaders, Chrome can only be used by Google.
These interdependencies highlight how Google has attempted to interlock its products to hinder interoperability and strengthen the need for the Google ecosystem, rather than the technological impossibility of these products and services functioning independently. Google’s numerous antitrust cases around the world have revealed a pattern of exclusionary behavior and interconnected product tie-ins. At this stage, the company’s assertions that customers benefit from more integration across its services should be seriously questioned.
Chrome hasn’t affected Google’s search business, and it can do so again. Ten years after the formal debut of Google Search, Google introduced Chrome in 2008. Initially, Chrome was a hybrid of Google’s V8 JavaScript engine and WebKit, an open-source web engine developed by Apple that powered their Safari web browser. Prior to its release, Google also acquired the browser-based anti-malware startup GreenBorder and the mobile browser manufacturer Reqwireless, both of which enhanced Chrome.
Only a few years later, Chrome was completely acquired by Google after being spun off from this dual structure. Given that WebKit partners were “slowing down” development, Google would “fork” WebKit (create its own version) and call it Blink in 2013. That forking gave rise to the Chromium open-source project, which is currently compatible with Chrome and other browsers. However, Google has moved away from allowing an open web that is interoperable with other browsers and toward web standards under a “works best for Chrome” policy, even if it has maintained Chromium open source.
The allegation that an independent Chrome would compromise users’ security and privacy is the least convincing of Google’s arguments. Because Chrome is not regarded as a privacy-friendly browser, there are several Chrome extensions that aim to satisfy users’ privacy needs. Chrome is the web browser that uses third-party cookies to gather the most personal information, including from Apple devices. Giving thousands of businesses, including those in China and Russia, unfettered access to our data is the foundation of Google’s advertising business, which the court in a different case also declared to be an illegal monopoly.
Google has broken its own data privacy policies, and Chrome has participated in these infractions. Google recently settled a class action lawsuit in California in 2023 after it was discovered that Chrome’s “incognito mode” was a fabrication. Although Google was released from paying compensation, the settlement compelled the company to remove user data belonging to 136 million users.
Ensuring a well-organized divestment
During the final arguments, Judge Mehta posed two important queries. First, considering the size of the organization needed to successfully absorb and manage the purchase, who would be eligible to run Chrome? Second, is it important to us if the new owner of Chrome lets Google continue to be the default search engine?
In response to the first worry, the DOJ said that a Chrome spin-off would inevitably require the buyer to acquire Google teams. In fact, the remedies phase demonstrated that Google possesses the know-how to buy and sell technologies in deals involving significant staff transfers. The 2012 sale of Google’s Motorola Home subsidiary to Arris Group was highlighted by tech mergers and acquisitions expert witness David Locala as an example of a successful transaction including the transfer of hundreds of engineers.
Additionally, the DOJ reaffirmed that a prospective purchase will be evaluated according to criteria that include pledges to invest in Chromium and safeguard and distribute user data. “Microsoft, which runs the second most popular search engine, Bing, would not be considered as a buyer,” said Colorado attorney Jonathan Sallet, who is one of 38 state attorneys general who have joined the DOJ’s complaint. This would lessen the likelihood that Google Search and Bing would become a duopoly in the search business.
Regarding the second query, the DOJ holds that every independent Chrome user should be allowed to conduct business with any search engine. Google Search could continue to be the default search engine as a result. But the DOJ affirmed that a new owner of Chrome would not be allowed to accept money from Google’s search business. The DOJ claims that this is a major deterrent for a new owner of Chrome to keep favoring Google.
Google would no longer possess a browser or be the default option in a divested Chrome, according to the DOJ’s ideal scenario. However, by, for instance, keeping its search engine as the default option, Google may still threaten to block access to it or otherwise hinder interoperability for browsers that do not prefer it.
The DOJ has also proposed other clauses to prevent such situation: Google would not be allowed to “frustrate or interfere with” browsers’ decision to conduct business with Google’s search competitors, including AI-assisted search solutions. This should, in theory, bar Google from preventing other browser providers and a new owner of Chrome from creating new competitive procedures for selecting a default search engine. These procedures might involve setting up browsers by default that put privacy first or developing whole new methods of web search that would completely avoid search engines, including using artificial intelligence systems.
Breakups Are Effective
The government is still working on the specifics of its proposed remedy. This is not out of the ordinary. AT&T had to spend six months developing a comprehensive divestiture plan following the last split of this size, which took place in the early 1980s. In this instance, the DOJ has previously stated that if and when structural relief is mandated, it will create a more thorough procedure.
The AT&T case actually demonstrates how customers gain from breakups. In addition to holding a 90 percent monopoly on phone services, AT&T also controlled a business that sold monopolistic phone equipment, charging customers exorbitant prices to fund the running of its landline network. The antitrust case showed that AT&T’s highly integrated structure hindered competition, which is why a breakup was necessary. The separation laid the groundwork for the wireless connectivity we still enjoy today by promoting the establishment of more varied technology patents and enabling the expansion of cellular communications.
The CEO of Google says that the DOJ’s suggested solutions will “kill” the company. However, a Chrome spin-off will change Google’s competitive options rather than preventing it from engaging in other lawful forms of competition. We must make sure that the next owner of Chrome is capable of maintaining and running Chrome and Chromium as the vital infrastructure that it has evolved into, creating a workable business or non-profit model for open web access, and optimizing the user experience for all search engines, whether or not they are AI-enabled.
According to Supreme Court precedent, the public interest is served when the government’s pursuit of equitable remedy in antitrust cases successfully restores competition in a market that has been unlawfully monopolized. We have yet to observe what breakthroughs might result from eliminating Google’s decades-long discriminatory practices in the online search space.
